After Immanuel Kant Part Three: Aesthetics
What Can We Hope For?
Welcome to my third and final part of reflections on Kant’s three Critiques. I have been hesitant in writing this part because his Critique of Judgment, even after having read Kristi Sweet’s commentary, has evaded my understanding more so than the previous Critiques. It shall be noted that the first two Critiques are certainly not grasped well by me either, but then again, who has grasped them adequately?
Kant’s third Critique builds on the cognitive themes of The Critique of Pure Reason and The Critique of Practical Reason to provide a compelling account of teleology, aesthetic criticism, and purpose to the communal human. Kant asks what we can know, how we can know it, and what we can hope for. The Critique of Judgment attempts to answer what we can hope for.
The Scope
When I reflect on the third Critique, I reflect on the many arguments that I have had, and the many arguments that pervade the world of aesthetics, and if we are in a position to objectively judge a piece of art, a score of music, a film, or even the tastes of food and drink. I have certainly had my own proclivity to gate-keep particular films, such as Interstellar, The Dark Knight, and No Country for Old Men, behind an impenetrable wall of deeming them ‘objectively great’ pieces of art. Anyone who disagrees with me might be met with an argument. The same goes for particular bottles of gin, paintings, architectural designs, and even video games. I often make these uncompromising judgments without thinking or recognizing that some tastes, desires, and interests are different than my own. I believe we are all guilty of this. Kant addresses these arguments and other aesthetic points of contention.
I have also pondered where a line is drawn between judgment of something’s greatness and our own attraction or pleasure-response to that thing. For example, I greatly despise Indian food and typically avoid it at all costs. However, I am not ignorant enough to not acknowledge the various degrees of skill and craftsmanship that go into cultivating a great Indian dish. Though I might not like even the best Indian dish, I am still tempted to argue that there is a ‘more beautiful’ (regarding taste) judgment to be bestowed on an Indian dish when compared to another Indian dish. Another example: I do not tend to like any brand of Tequila, but there are certainly ‘better’ Tequilas in the world of Tequilas, and one might present a story or distillation method that I find more inspiring, wonderful, and beautiful than another. You might agree with me, but how do we devise this criterion for judgments on things that are not directly pleasurable to us? If we happen to enjoy Indian food, we might find ourselves more equipped to judge competing dishes. However, when we do not enjoy the category at all, on what basis do we make critiques? We might be inclined to argue that we judge on time spent developing the art, the story behind the creator, or even the misleading idea of ‘if it’s complex beyond my understanding, it must be truly wonderful.’ It is not hard to think of easy rebuttals to all of these, so we are left with a difficult problem: are we able to make objective judgments?
Kant is not just contributing to aesthetic debate; he is far more involved than petty polemics. Kant is concerned with the telos of our world, the truth we can be assured of, and the beauty we can rejoice in. There is an orientation of beauty that is directed at the human person. One might even speculate that Heidegger’s notion that Dasein’s world is comported to Dasein was cultivated with strong readings of Kant’s third Critique.
Kant and Subjective-Objective Judgments
Kant’s approach to this debate is nuanced and offers something that, for better or worse, both sides, the objectivists and the relativists, might benefit from. Specifically, Kant argues that when we make judgments of the beautiful, we are making a subjective assent to the objective. Kant says, “that in making a judgment of taste (about the beautiful) we require everyone to like the object…”1 The judgments are put forward as “having general validity.”2 These judgments are based on concepts; you might recall that the notion of concepts and their a priori nature was first deduced in The Critique of Pure Reason. However, notably, the concepts used to make an aesthetic judgment hold as aesthetic universalities, not logical universalities. Paradoxically, “the [universal] quantity of the judgment is not objective but only subjective.”3 “A judgment that is universally valid objectively is always subjectively so too, i.e., if the judgment is valid for everything contained under a given concept, then it is also valid for everyone who presents an object by means of this concept.”4 Kant is essentially saying that aesthetic judgments have a subjective universal validity. The subjective nature of the judgment rests on the fact that the judgment is made with a non-logically universalizable concept.
Radically, Kant is arguing that when we make aesthetic judgments, we are not referring to the object itself, but rather the schematized product of our understanding, established in the first Critique. When I listen to Bach, and I declare, “Bach sounds great”, this predicate of ‘great’ is not directed at Bach (even if I think it is); rather, it is directed at you, the subjects I am claiming to. The predicate, ‘is great’, is referring to Bach, but not making assent to him.
In a crude summary, the object being judged has attributes that we can measure, judge, and critique, but it would be erroneous to believe that we are critiquing the thing itself. Kant distinguishes in the first Critique between noumenon and phenomenon. The noumenal world is a world we do not have access to; we never perceive the thing itself, only the product of our understanding, schematizing the presentation of the thing. This is not to say that everyone lives in a radically solipsistic world, or that no external entities exist. Rather, Kant is acknowledging the unique perceptions that everyone has regarding judgments.
Though it might not be the most satisfying, aesthetic judgments are both objective and subjective at the same time. Might Kant’s perspective quell all debate? No, but it might quell a lot of it. We often assume a position of authority in aesthetic judgments, and we do, in fact, relegate a lot of authority to particular classes: art critics, cineophiles, painters, book reviewers, art curators, etc. These folks might not necessarily be getting a different presentation of the object, but the schematizing that occurs in their cognitions might gestate a radically more nuanced product. To me, the Mona Lisa is a blurry, boring, and dated piece; it elicits no awe or wonder in me. However, had I a robust knowledge of the Renaissance period’s history and artistic creations, I might see it in a new light. However, even that might not stop me from finding the color scheme dull and boring. Kant does indeed provide some assurances to the objectivists however. Kant ties beauty in with the moral, a reason I am so entranced by him. For Kant, the morally good person is rare; they are like a genius, and they must be capable of creating aesthetically noticeable artifacts for us. Their moral will guides their aesthetic developments. This person will also have taste, “the ability to judge an object, or a way of presenting it, by means of a liking or disliking devoid of all interest.”5 That Kant charges interest to be removed from a judgment reveals a disposition to reliable reflection untainted by partiality. How to cultivate taste and what is ‘good’ taste is sadly, not confronted by Kant.
Kant defines beautiful as “what, without a concept, is liked universally.” This is because beauty is a concept that we invoke, not a judgment. Kant’s ambition in The Critique of Judgment is not to settle this debate once and for all, for the scope of the project is far greater.
A Force of Nature
Man finds himself in this postmodern world existentially plagued with angst. Rather than a human-focused telos being woven into the fabric of the world, man is left in an existential wasteland, forced to create his own meaning. Kant breathes life back into the world and creates a morally charged environment in which man now has duties to uphold. Kant believes that if everyone performed their duties, we would enter a Kingdom of Ends, a hypothetical utopia where all people are seen as ends in themselves. However, turning on the news or even looking within oneself will quickly show why the Kingdom of Ends will never be realized. What does man make of this world? Is there hope for man?
Putting aside man-made art, nature is charged for us. It bears a trait that Kant calls “purposiveness”. Purposiveness entails the possibilities of an object. These possibilities are explicitly related to the ends of the item and thus purposiveness invokes teleology.6 Beautifully… Kant is saying that what merely is, is for us. The world’s aesthetic proclivities are teleologically tuned for human exposure. We are not in a world famished of meaning; the wasteland is not real, rather, we inhabit an intentional world. In a sense, we can be assured that we belong. Deep in Kant’s notes, he remarks that beautiful things “indicate that the human being belongs in the world.”7 Kristi Sweet notes that this acknowledgment, “task of reflection”, displaces the human being “from their place at the center of the cosmos and returned [him] as a part of a greater whole.”8 Nature seems to be communicating to us. Kant is not giving nature a will or consciousness. Rather, he is giving it purpose, and that purpose answers Kant’s question (which is also our question), ‘what can we hope for?’ Kant places the beauty of nature over the beauty of art; its aesthetic attributes assent to our cognition and make an impression on us that pierces into our existential concerns.
The Marriage
For Kant, these two philosophies, of nature and aesthetic judgments, meet with the genius. The genius is a rare, morally tuned individual who has an aesthetic conception that aligns with duties and morality. The genius can be a poet, a filmmaker, a painter, or a moral actor setting an example. Reason gives us morality; it does not give us aesthetics. But morality from reason can and does give us aesthetic revelations. I was particularly moved by Kant’s comments regarding the “sublime”. The sublime “does violence” to our imagination.9 The sublime is not something more beautiful than other things; it is not beautiful; it is awe-some. Its sheer force of existence cannot be adequately accounted for in our understanding’s cognizing.
This image is breathtaking, but to imagine being on the boat and encountering the sun, waves, the smell of salt water, and the crashing of rough water on the hull of my boat would disable my competence. For this reason, Kant says the sublime has a “countrapurposive” effect on our judgment. The more violence done to our imagination, the more sublime the thing is.
Conclusion
Much more can be said about Kant’s aesthetic philosophy; I certainly did an injustice in my reflection, but then again, it is MY reflection. I am not a loyalist to Kant, but he is a philosophically sound poet to the intellect. Kant’s philosophy, particularly in the area of morals, has radically changed my life. Teleology, normative ethics, and notions of the objective beautiful have been heavily guarded by arrogant metaphysical dogmatists of religion and partisanship. Kant liberates these notions that are intrinsic to us all and grounds them in reason. Kant is the hero of my hero, Derek Parfit, and after reading Kant’s three Critiques, I can understand why Parfit wrestles with him so much in On What Matters. Kant does not give us a cold philosophy devoid of meaning. Reason need not be alien to the beautiful and the purposive. Rather, Kant marries these ideas in a harmonious ode to the senses. Man might find himself confused in this modern world. 9 billion people are enough to make us feel paradoxically alone, but the world around us has a comportment towards us and our moral success. This comportment might be directed by God, but we can be more confident in it thanks to Kant.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment (Hackett Publishing Company, 1987). pg. 57.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment (Hackett Publishing Company, 1987). pg. 57.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment (Hackett Publishing Company, 1987). pg. 58.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment (Hackett Publishing Company, 1987). pg. 58.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment (Hackett Publishing Company, 1987). pg. 53.
Kristi Sweet, Kant on Freedom, Nature, and Judgment: The Territory of the Third Critique (Cambridge University Press, 2024). pg. 67-68.
Kristi Sweet, Kant on Freedom, Nature, and Judgment: The Territory of the Third Critique (Cambridge University Press, 2024). pg. 73.
Kristi Sweet, Kant on Freedom, Nature, and Judgment: The Territory of the Third Critique (Cambridge University Press, 2024). pg. 76.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment (Hackett Publishing Company, 1987). pg. 99.





